Stockholders in hundreds of thousands of closely held companies are intimately affected by the value of their shares, even though they lack a public market. A critical aspect in determining the fair market value of closely held securities is the discount for lack of marketability. The term discount for lack of marketability is a general term in business valuation referring to impairment of value for reasons relating to marketability and/or liquidity.
the older studies. For the 49 private transactions analyzed in detail, the average (mean) discount was 27.7% and the median discount was 28.8%. Small companies tended to have larger discounts than large companies.
Pre-IPO Studies
In 1980, in an effort to better quantify the critical importance of marketability as an element of value, I started to study the price relationship between stock transactions and subsequent initial public offerings (IPOs) of the same stock as described in the IPO prospectus.
From the outset of my work at Robert W. Baird & Co. Incorporated ("Baird"), I had been involved in the pricing of IPOs and was very familiar with prospectuses as I assisted drafting those where we were the managing underwriter. It was clear to me that anticipated IPOs did not always occur, the price of the stock in an IPO was not set until immediately before the IPO and that marketability was very valuable.
It was my thought that if the prices at which private transactions took place before the IPO could be related to the price at which the stock was offered subsequently to the public, another gauge as to the magnitude of the value of marketability might be available. This has indeed proved to be the case. A prospectus is obliged to identify securities transactions between principals and insiders since the registrants last fiscal year prior to the offering.
In order to provide a reasonable comparison of prices before and at the IPO, I felt it necessary both for the company to have been reasonably sound and for the private transaction to have occurred within a period of five months prior to the offering date. Since an initial public offering often takes four or five months from conception to completion, the transactions mentioned in the prospectuses in the study would almost certainly have reflected the likelihood of marketability and any other value adjustment associated with being a public company.
In keeping with these guidelines and prior studies, development stage companies, companies with a history of real operating losses and companies whose IPO price was less than $5 per share have been eliminated from consideration. In the remaining situations the companies were promising in nature, and their securities had good potential for becoming readily marketable. Why else would investors have bought the unregistered stock and why would a bona fide investment banker pursue a firm underwriting commitment? It should be noted that almost all of the major investment banks are represented as lead underwriters of the IPOs used in this study, as has been the case in previous studies.
The transactions primarily took one of two forms: (1) the granting of stock options with an exercise price equal to the stock's then fair market value; or (2) the sale of stock or, in a few situations, the sale of securities convertible into stock in which case we conservatively accepted the conversion price as being indicative of the fair market value of the stock. In most cases, the transactions were stated to have been, or could reasonably be expected to have been, at fair market value. All ultimately would have had to be able to withstand SEC, IRS or judicial review, particularly in light of the subsequent public offering.
While the sale of stock can be rather straightforward, the granting of an option typically depends on a determination of fair market value by the board of directors if there is no public market for the stock. Our experience at Baird with stock options granted within a few months of an IPO, when their exercise price is substantially lower than the anticipated offering price as stated in the registration statement, is that the SEC will raise a question as to the issuance of "cheap stock". This issue must be satisfactorily resolved before the SEC or state "blue sky" commissions will permit the shares to be sold to the public. As a result, directors and underwriters take this issue very seriously and such stock option exercise prices must be very defensible. A surprise in the current study was the many IPO companies that granted stock options having an exercise price at what was subsequently determined to be below fair market value and therefore took a charge to earnings.
The 1995-1997 study is the eighth in a series of like studies done in the same way, over a period of approximately 17 ½ years in 18-month segments. The studies were done in very diverse market conditions yet the results were not dissimilar. As examples, in the 1980-1981 study the prime rate of interest went from 15.25% to 20% and the Dow Jones Industrial Average ("DJIA") was up 16.5%. In the 1985-1986 study, the prime rate went from 10.75% to 8.5% while the DJIA was up 58%. The 1987-1989 study encompassed the October 1987 stock market crash. The 1992-1993 study saw a strong IPO market, modestly declining interest rates and a generally firm stock market that rose 10% as measured by the DJIA. The 1994-1995 study saw a very difficult bond market and the DJIA rose 21%, 19% in the last 6 months of the 18 month study period.
The 1995-1997 study saw a strong move in the stock market as measured by the DJIA, going from 4,766.68 to 7,008.99 for a 47% move. Interest rates were relatively flat and the market for IPOs could be considered hot.
In the eight studies, over 2,200 prospectuses were reviewed and 310 qualifying transactions were found. The mean discount for the 310 transactions in the eight studies was 44% and the median was 43%.
In this study, we reviewed 732 prospectuses for IPOs and found 91 transactions that met our criteria. These transactions took place at 43% average (mean) and 42% median discounts from the price at which the stock subsequently came to market (See Appendix).
The transactions were relatively well spaced within the five month time frame. The discounts tended to be somewhat lower close to the IPO date and higher four or five months prior to the IPO date, although the relationship was not clear. Of the 310 transactions in the eight studies, 67 were sale transactions and 239 were option transactions. Of particular interest is that, on average, sale transactions have higher discounts than option transactions and that this difference has significantly increased.
# of IPO
The eight studies' mean discount for the 67 sale transactions was 50%, the median was 51%.
The 22 sale transactions in the 1995-1997 study took place at mean and median discounts of 54% and 61%, respectively. The 13 sale transactions in the 1994-1995 study took place at mean and median discounts of 46% and 47%, respectively, while the 7 sale transactions in the 1992-1993 study took place at 49% and 46%. 1995 -1997 22 54% 61% 1994 -1995 13 46% 47% 1992 -1993 7 49% 46% All 8 Studies 67 50% 51%
Sale Transactions

Study
# of Transactions Mean Discount Median Discount
For further information, we have included an additional schedule of the 1995-1997 sale transactions which includes the size of the transaction in shares as well as a short description of the transaction. Size of transaction does not seem to be much of an influence on the size of the discount.
Discounts arising from option transactions in the current 1995-1997 study were significantly lower than those from sale transactions. This is not too surprising in light of the cheap stock concerns and high public stock valuations.
The eight studies' mean discount for the 239 option transactions was 43%, the median was also 43%. The mean and median discounts from the 69 option transactions in the 1995 -1997 study were 39% and 40%, respectively. These were down from the 1994 -1995 study's 44% and 43% discounts which were themselves down from 1992 -1993 study's 45% and 44%. Recent discussions with several appraisers indicated that their clients in general had made it clear that they did not want cheap stock problems. This may explain why option related discounts dropped in the current study. The preponderance of lower discounts arising from the granting of options tends to keep the study's overall average discount lower than otherwise would be the case.
There may be changes between the pre-IPO price and the IPO itself, which can impact pricing at those times, in addition to lack of marketability. These could include changes in financial performance, capitalization, management, as well as unforeseen external factors. However, marketability, or the promise of marketability, tends to account for most of the differences in pricing pre-IPO and at the IPO.
In my experience IPOs are sold primarily to relatively sophisticated, rational investors.
Reputable investment bankers do not sell IPOs to their customers expecting that they will be a bad investment. On pre-IPO roadshows around the country, the IPO company management is subject to intensive questioning from sophisticated investors and money managers about their company and its prospects. The above is mentioned because IPOs are priced on the basis of feedback and intense scrutiny from market participants.
Because more companies were coming to the market with no earnings and, in some cases, with no sales, a final cut of 38 transactions which otherwise would have met our criteria was made.
This was to keep the companies used comparable to those in prior studies on a quality basis. It is of interest that the mean and median discounts for these eliminated 38 transactions were 48% and 47%, respectively versus the 43% and 42% found in the primary study. of Business Valuation Review, of which he is Associate Editor. In it Mr. Fowler addresses the sometimes stated notion that specific "empirical" or "market" evidence that directly bears on the business interest being valued is required to sustain sizeable lack of marketability discounts. He does this in light of the multiple discount studies since 1970 that indicate average discounts that group around 30% to 45%. His following quote is significant regarding the usefulness of the discount studies' averages.
Significance of Discount Averages
The (IRS) 1994 manual, Valuation Training for Appeals Officers, at pages 1-11 provides an interesting and somewhat analogous discussion of the usefulness of observing market activity when there are enough samples to establish a pattern. It states: "While individual sales may deviate from the normal pattern of the market, an adequate number of sales will tend to reflect the pattern of buyers and sellers. The pattern of a sufficient number of sales is a good reflection of market value. If there is a sufficiently active market, a pattern will usually emerge. A good rule of thumb is to use enough comparables to develop a definite pattern. Most buyers and sellers will consult the market in their negotiations so that a sales pattern will often tend to be self-generating."
Summary
The final question to be answered is that if the kinds of discounts found in the above studies are appropriate for promising situations where marketability is probable, but not a certainty, how much greater should discounts be for the more typical company's stock that has no marketability, little if any chance of ever becoming marketable, and is in a neutral to unpromising situation?
In summary, the size of the discount for lack of marketability depends upon the individual situation. While there is not one discount for lack of marketability applicable at all times and to all situations, it is apparent that the lack of marketability is one of the most important components of value, and the public marketplace emphasizes this point. 
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